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Abstract
We propose a mechanism that relates asset returns to the Þrms optimal listing choice. The
crucial element in our framework is not a difference in the structure or rules of the alternative
markets, but a difference in the return patterns of the securities that are traded on these
markets. We use a simple trading model with asymmetric information to show that a stock
would be more liquid when it is listed on a market with similar securities, or securities
with correlated payoff patterns. We empirically examine the implications of our model using
NYSE and Nasdaq securities, and document that the return patterns of stocks listed on
the NYSE indeed look different from the return patterns of Nasdaq stocks. Stocks that are
eligible to list on another market but do not switch have return patterns that are similar to
other securities on their own market and different from securities listed on the other market.
We show that the return patterns of stocks that switch markets change in the two years
prior to the move in the direction of being more similar to the stocks on the new market.
Our results are consistent with the notion that managers choose the market on which to list
to maximize the liquidity of their stocks.
Asset Returns and the Listing Choice of Firms
One of the major decisions made by managers of Þrms is where to list their stocks.
Together with decisions on Þnancing and payout policy, the listing choice affects investors
and has the potential to impact the value of the Þrm. The literature on the listing choice
suggests a couple of ways by which optimal listing can beneÞt investors. For example, listing
on the market that is more appropriate for a Þrm can improve liquidity.1 Investors value the
lower cost of transacting in the stock and therefore such an improvement would increase the
value of the Þrm (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Listing on a more appropriate market can
also increase the visibility of a Þrm.2 More visibility attracts a larger investor base and can
therefore result in a higher Þrm value (Merton, 1987).
In the U.S., researchers have attempted to analyze the determinants of managers optimal
choice in the context of two dominant markets, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and
the Nasdaq National Market. Because there are differences in the structures, rules, and
listing requirements of these two markets, much of the research has focused on identifying
the structural element or the rule that either makes one market superior to the other or
explains the reasoning behind the decisions of some Þrms to list on Nasdaq and others on
the NYSE.
For example, Heidle and Huang (2002) and Lipson (2002) observe that the NYSE is a
centralized ßoor-auction market while the Nasdaq is a fragmented screen-based market with
multiple dealers and alternative trading systems. If some investors have private information
and they can better hide in a fragmented screen-based market, moving from Nasdaq to the
NYSE would beneÞt investors by reducing the extent of adverse selection. Foucault and
Parlour (2003) note that different markets may charge different listing fees, a situation that
characterizes the NYSE and Nasdaq. They provide a model where Þrms self-select to the
1See Grammatikos and Papaioannou (1986), Sanger and McConnell (1986), Edelman and Baker (1990),
Sanger and Peterson (1990), Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992), Christie and Huang (1994), Kadlec
and McConnell (1994), Elyasiani, Hauser, and Lauterbach (2000), Kalay and Portniaguina (2001), and
Bessembinder and Rath (2002).
2See Kadlec and McConnell (1994), Aggarwal and Angel (1997), and Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999a,
1999b).
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most appropriate market as a tradeoff exists between listing fees and transaction costs. Wan
(2001) argues that the different market structures give rise to different volume Þgures on the
NYSE and Nasdaq, and that SEC rules restricting the trading of insiders are therefore less
binding on Nasdaq. His argument implies that incentives of insiders that are not shared by
outside shareholders may affect the listing choice.3 Cowan, Carter, Dark, and Singh (1992)
suggest that NYSE rules discouraging unequal voting rights of multiple share classes may
also inßuence the decision of managers on where to list.4
In this paper we propose a new determinant of the listing decision. We abstract from the
particular features of U.S. markets and instead put forward a mechanism that relates the
Þrms asset returns to the optimal listing choice. The crucial element in our framework is
not a difference in the structure or rules of the markets, but rather a difference in the return
patterns of the securities that are traded on these markets.
We begin by developing a simple trading model where multiple securities are traded in one
of two markets and there is information asymmetry among investors. We show that a stock
is more liquid when it is listed on a market with similar securities, or other securities with
correlated payoff patterns. The driving force behind the result is that market makers can
extract useful information about the value of the stock from the order ßows of other securities
in the market. Therefore, trades have smaller price impacts (or lower adverse selection costs)
reßecting greater conÞdence market makers have in the prices they set. If adverse selection
and other impediments to liquidity are priced (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Easley
and OHara, 2004), our model suggests that a manager who maximizes shareholder value
would want to list his stock on a market with similar securities.
This insight can explain why managers of Þrms often cite their desire to be on a market
with similar Þrms as a motive for choosing to list on a particular market. For example, the
Chairman and CEO of Allied Capital commented on their move from Nasdaq to the NYSE
3See also the models of Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier (1999) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2003)
that demonstrate how insiders listing decisions can be affected by public disclosure requirements.
4See also Aggarwal and Angel (1997), Bessembinder (2000), Corwin and Harris (2001), and Jain and Kim
(2004).
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saying There arent a lot of dividend-paying stocks on Nasdaq, and, as a dividend payer,
we really think our stock is better suited to the NYSE. President and CFO of Aeroßex was
quoted on their move from the NYSE to Nasdaq saying We believe listing on Nasdaq will
help position Aeroßex among its peer group of other high technology companies. The CFO
of CARBO Ceramics noted on the move of his Þrm from Nasdaq to the NYSE Although
the Nasdaq National Market has been extremely helpful to us since our initial public offering
in 1996, we believe that our move to the New York Stock Exchange is consistent with the
NYSE listing of the majority of publicly-traded companies in the oilÞeld services industry.5
These quotes suggest that while managers of Þrms may not be thinking explicitly in terms
of the comovement of their stocks returns with those of other Þrms, they probably have an
intuitive notion of what constitutes a similar Þrm. Therefore, our model provides the
rationale for why Þrms in the same industry, presumably having more commonality in their
return patterns, tend to list on the same market. The quote about Allied Capitals move
suggests, however, that industry membership may not always be the determining criterion.
A mature Þrm in a certain industry may have more in common with a mature Þrm in
another industry than with a start-up in its own industry. When a Þrm matures and its
payoffs change to reßect more of the general conditions in the economy, it may be better off
switching to a market with other mature Þrms. This seems to correspond to the path many
Þrms take when listing for the Þrst time on Nasdaq and then moving to the NYSE. Still, not
all Nasdaq Þrms that are eligible to list on the NYSE switch markets.
We therefore proceed to empirically examine the implications of our model using NYSE
and Nasdaq securities in 2001. There is more than one way in which we can deÞne simi-
larity in the return patterns of securities, and each deÞnition suggests a different empirical
methodology. The Þrst deÞnition we implement draws on an interpretation of the signals in
our model as private information about common factors in returns (see also Subrahmanyam,
5The quotes are taken from: (i) Allied Capital Corp. Moves to Bid Board by Robyn Kurdek in the
Venture Capital Journal, June 1, 2001, (ii) a press release by Aeroßex Incorporate, February 17, 2000,
and (iii) CARBO Ceramics Announces Completion of Public Offering and Move to the New York Stock
Exchange on the PR Newswire, May 19, 2000.
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1991; Caballe and Krishnan, 1994). We therefore examine similarity in returns by looking
at the loadings of securities on estimates of common factors from a principal component
procedure. Our second deÞnition does not associate private information in the model with
common factors. Rather, the private signals contain information that is relevant to a subset
of stocks, and better estimates of the sensitivities to the signals (that determine the optimal
listing choice in our model) can be obtained by eliminating the market component in returns
and examining correlations of return residuals.
Our Þrst test provides a check on the basic assumption in the model that the two markets
differ in terms of the return patterns of the stocks that are listed on them (or that stocks
listed on the NYSE have different return patterns from those of Nasdaq stocks). We create
four groups: (i) Nasdaq National Market stocks that are eligible to list on the NYSE, (ii)
Nasdaq National Market securities that are not eligible to list on the NYSE, (iii) NYSE
stocks that are eligible to list on Nasdaq, and (iv) NYSE securities that are not eligible to
list on Nasdaq. We conduct a principal component analysis of 60 portfolios, 15 from each
of the four groups, using daily returns in 2001. We Þnd that Nasdaq securities load more
heavily on the Þrst principal component and that NYSE securities load more heavily on the
second principal component, consistent with the basic assumption of our model.
When testing the models predictions, we look both at Þrms that switch markets and
at Þrms that are eligible to switch but stay. While managers of the switching Þrms make
an active decision to move, managers of those remaining make passive decisions that
impact the liquidity of their stocks. We start by examining the passive decisions of Þrms
that are eligible to move but do not. Our model predicts that, if managers of Þrms seek
to improve liquidity by their choice of listing, Nasdaq stocks that are eligible to list on the
NYSE but do not move will load more on the same common factor as non-eligible Nasdaq
securities and less on the common factor to which NYSE securities are more sensitive. A
similar logic applies to NYSE stocks that are eligible to list on Nasdaq but do not move, and
we would expect them to resemble other NYSE securities more than Nasdaq securities.
4
Our principal component analysis demonstrates that this is indeed the case: Nasdaq
Þrms that are eligible to list on the NYSE but remain on Nasdaq have similar loadings to
other Nasdaq Þrms, but very different loadings from those of NYSE Þrms. NYSE Þrms that
are eligible to list on Nasdaq indeed look very similar to other NYSE Þrms but very different
from Nasdaq Þrms. We then apply our second deÞnition of similarity in return patterns
by constructing estimates of the sensitivities to the signals using correlations of normalized
residuals from market model regressions. Our model predicts that for eligible stocks, the
sensitivity to the signal that affects securities in their own market should be greater than
the sensitivity to the signal that affects securities in the other market. We Þnd that this
is indeed the case, and therefore the results using both deÞnitions of similarity in return
patterns support the notion that the passive decisions managers make by remaining listed
on their markets are optimal with respect to liquidity.
We then examine the active choices made by managers of Þrms who move between
Nasdaq and the NYSE in 2001. Looking at switching Þrms also demonstrates the robustness
of our conclusions to an alternative hypothesis that listing on a market attracts market-
speciÞc liquidity trading and thus induces similarity in the return patterns of the listing Þrm
and other Þrms traded on the same market. The empirical tests contrast our model with the
alternative hypothesis by looking at the return patterns of Þrms that switch listings from one
market to another before they switch. We Þnd evidence of a change in the return patterns
two years prior to the move to the new market, and that the return patterns of stocks that
switch change in the direction of being more similar to the stocks listed on the new market.
These results support the conclusion that managers make optimal listing decisions.
One contribution of our work is that it proposes a new determinant of the listing choice.
We show how the listing venue affects liquidity through the learning process of market
participants about private information in prices. We test the model (both the assumption
and the implications) using various methodologies and Þnd that managers seem to behave
optimally in the sense of our modelas if they want to maximize the liquidity of their stocks.
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When Þrms behave this way, the mechanism we propose as a determinant of the listing choice
would perpetuate itself. In other words, when Þrms make active decisions to list on markets
already populated by similar Þrms, the assumption of our model that the two markets differ
in terms of the return patterns of the Þrms that are listed on them will continue to hold.
As long as the assumption holds, the optimal listing choice will be to join the venue where
similar Þrms are listed. Hence, this determinant of the listing choice seems robust to changes
in the structures or rules of markets.
Another contribution of our approach is to propose a relation that goes from asset return
patterns to the decisions of managers through an information-asymmetry-driven market
microstructure trading model. Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman
(2001) recently presented models where a manager can learn useful information from his
Þrms stock price. Our analysis suggests that certain managerial decisions would beneÞt
from examining the Þrms return pattern alongside the return patterns of other securities in
the market. And while we Þnd support for the optimal listing choices of NYSE and Nasdaq
Þrms, the nature of our approach provides an intuition that is more general than the speciÞcs
of these two markets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We present the theoretical model and derive the
implications for the relation between the listing choice and liquidity in Section 1. Section 2 is
devoted to the empirical work: the sample construction, the tests on eligible and non-eligible
securities, and the tests using switching Þrms. Section 4 is a conclusion.
I Theory
The purpose of this section is to develop a simple model that relates the listing choice to
liquidity. We Þrst describe the market prior to the listing of a new asset. We consider an
economy with one risk-free asset and two risky assets (asset 1 and asset 2). Without loss of
generality, we set the return on the risk-free asset to zero. Each risky asset is traded in a
separate market organized as in Kyle (1985), where prices are set by competitive and risk-
6
neutral market makers.6 After each round of trading, there is a public release of information
and the competitive market makers agree that the values of risky assets 1 and 2 have changed
by the payoff innovations s1+ θ1 and s2+ θ2, respectively. We further assume that s1, s2 are
standard normal random variables, independent of each other and independent of θ1 and θ2.
The random variables θ1 and θ2 have zero means and can be correlated with each other.
We view each asset in the model as representing a group of similar assets traded on a
single market. To simplify the exposition, we assume that assets listed on one market have
a payoff component that does not exist in the payoffs of assets listed on the other market.
Similar results can be obtained if asset payoffs in both markets are weighted averages of
both s1 and s2, but the weight on s1 is greater in one market and the weight on s2 is greater
in the other market. The primitive of our approach therefore is that similar assets (those
with a common payoff component) are listed on the same market. We then investigate the
implication of this assumption to the choice of a Þrm that considers where to list or whether
to move from one market to another when the distribution of its payoffs changes.
The economy is populated by liquidity traders, informed traders, and two groups of
market makers. We assume that the aggregate demand of the liquidity traders for each asset
is a standard normal random variable that is independent of all other innovations in the
market. There are two risk-neutral informed traders. The Þrst one observes the realization
of s1, which is an unbiased signal of the payoff of asset 1. Similarly, the second informed
trader observes the realization of s2. As in Kyle (1985), anonymity of traders implies that
market makers observe only aggregate net orders.
Since we posit two markets that are identical with respect to their structures and rules,
we need to introduce some sort of segmentation in order to have a meaningful distinction
between them. Therefore, we assume that market makers observe only the aggregate order
ßow that arrives in their own market before setting clearing prices. Benveniste, Marcus,
and Wilhelm (1992) and Coval and Shumway (2001) claim that traders in one market have
6See also Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2003) who investigate international cross-listings in a multi-
market model in the spirit of Kyle (1985).
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access to valuable information that is not shared by traders in another market. Chowdhry
and Nanda (1991) model a single asset that is traded on different exchanges. They also
assume that market makers in a given exchange observe only the order ßow that arrives
to their exchange. This is the feature that distinguishes one market from another in their
model, and similarly in our framework.7 Note that the segmentation we consider is only at
the time the order ßow arrives in the market. After a trade has taken place, market makers
in one market may observe prices set in the other market. Since we assume public release
of information after each round of trading, the model allows for economy-wide reporting of
last-trade prices.
We now introduce another risky asset, asset 3, that could potentially be listed on either
market. The innovation of asset 3 is given by as1+bs2+θ3, where a and b are scalars and θ3 is
a zero mean random variable, independent of s1 and s2, but possibly correlated with θ1 and
θ2. The liquidity demand for this asset is a standard normal random variable, independent
of all other random variables. The scalars a and b are the sensitivities of asset 3s payoffs to
the innovations s1 and s2. Say asset 3 is listed on market 1, where asset 1 is traded. Then,
market makers price asset 3 based not only on its own aggregate demand but also on the
demand they observe for the other asset listed on the same market. Similarly, if asset 3 is
listed on market 2, market makers can observe the aggregate demands for both assets 2 and
3 when setting the price of asset 3.
Segmentation of markets and risk-neutrality of the informed traders imply that the trad-
ing strategies and price rules in one market are unaffected by the trading activity taking
place in the other market. We can therefore study the outcome of each market separately,
and we focus on the market where asset 3 is listed.
7Our empirical work in Section II uses NYSE and Nasdaq as the two markets. If, as in Benveniste,
Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992), human interaction on the NYSE ßoor conveys information, Nasdaq market
makers have no access to information that NYSE specialists observe. Linkages such as ITS (the Intermarket
Trading System) do not alleviate this informational friction because only orders a market wishes to pass
on to another market travel through ITS as opposed to the entire order ßow. Also, conversations with
practitioners suggest that many trading desks on Wall Street are organized such that traders in listed stocks
sit together and traders in over-the-counter stocks sit together, facilitating better information sharing on
stocks that are traded on the same market.
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Consider Þrst the case in which asset 3 is listed on market 1. We can write the value of
the assets traded in market 1 using matrix notation as
V = µ+ F S + Θ,
where µ ∈ R2 is the value of the assets prior to the innovation, F is a matrix of scalars given
by
F =
!
1 0
a b
"
, (1)
S = (s1, s2) is the vector of payoff-relevant signals of the informed traders, and Θ = (θ1, θ3).
Let Z ∈ R2 be the orders submitted by the liquidity traders to market 1. Let X1 ∈ R2
and X2 ∈ R2 be the orders submitted by the Þrst and second informed traders, respectively.
Note that each informed trader can submit orders for both assets 1 and 3. Let P ∈ R2 be
the clearing prices of the two assets, X = X1+X2 be the aggregate demand of the informed
traders, and Y = X + Z be the net order ßow submitted to the market.
An equilibrium is a price rule P : R2 → R2 and strategiesX1, X2 ∈ R2 such that: (i) given
the strategies, the price rule satisÞes the condition P = E[ V |Y ], and (ii) given the price
rule, the i-th informed trader (i = {1, 2}) maximizes the expected proÞts E[( V − P )Xi|si].
Theorem 1. There exists a linear equilibrium in which (i) the price rule is given by P ( Y ) =
µ+ΛY , where Λ is a 2×2 matrix of scalars, and (ii) aggregate informed trading can be written
as X = βS, where β is a 2× 2 matrix of scalars. The matrices Λ and β are the solutions to
the system of equations (2) below satisfying the second order condition that −(ΛT + Λ) is a
negative semidefinite matrix:8
β = (Λ+ ΛT )−1F (2)
Λ = FβT (I + ββT )−1
Proof of the theorem can be found in Appendix A. In equilibrium, the diagonal entries
of the matrix Λ are the price impacts of market orders in asset 1 and asset 3. Let λ3(1) be
8Superscript T denotes the transpose operation and I denotes the identity matrix.
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the price impact of market orders in asset 3 when it is listed on market 1 (i.e., the second
row, second column entry of the matrix Λ). Similar to λ in the single-asset Kyle (1985)
model, λ3(1) measures the liquidity of asset 3. Indeed, an uniformed trader who demands
z of asset 3 expects to pay z2λ3(1) for immediacy. It follows from the proof provided in
Appendix A (see equation (6)) that
λ3(1) =
a2 + |b| (1 + |b|)
2
#
a2 + (1 + |b|)2
.
In order to compare liquidity when an asset is listed on one market versus the other,
we need to Þnd the price impact of market orders when asset 3 is listed on market 2. It is
straightforward to show that a similar linear equilibrium exists in this case as well, where
the price impact of market orders in asset 3 is given by9
λ3(2) =
b2 + |a| (1 + |a|)
2
#
b2 + (1 + |a|)2
.
To determine whether liquidity is better when asset 3 is listed on market 1 or on market 2,
we calculate the difference
λ3(1)
2 − λ3(2)2 = b
4 − a4 + 2(|b|3 − |a|3) + b2 − a2
4 (a2 + (1 + |b|)2) (b2 + (1 + |a|)2) (3)
The following proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 1. If |a| > |b| then liquidity is better when asset 3 is listed on market 1, and
if |b| > |a| then liquidity is better when asset 3 is listed on market 2.
Proposition 1 states that if the magnitude of the sensitivity of asset 3 to s1 (the payoff-
relevant private information of the Þrst informed trader) is greater than the magnitude of its
sensitivity to s2, then liquidity will be better if the asset is listed on market 1. Conversely,
if the magnitude of the sensitivity of asset 3 to s1 is smaller than its sensitivity to s2, then
liquidity will be better if the asset is listed on market 2
9The proof is analogous to the one of Theorem 1 and is therefore omitted for brevity.
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What is the intuition behind this result? The key can be found in the off-diagonal terms
of the matrix Λ that are speciÞed in the proof of Theorem 1. They represent the market
makers inference from order ßow of one asset that is relevant to the price of the other asset.
In the model, if we assume that θ1 and θ3 are uncorrelated, a is the comovement of the
payoffs of asset 1 and asset 3. Heuristically, the greater the magnitude of a, market makers
can learn more about the payoffs of asset 3 by observing the order ßow in asset 1.10 As such,
they do not need to change their beliefs (and hence the price) to the same extent in response
to the order ßow in asset 3, and therefore the price impact of market orders in asset 3, λ3(1),
is smaller. In other words, the liquidity of asset 3 when listed on market 1 will be better
than its liquidity when listed on market 2 if asset 3 comoves more with asset 1 than with
asset 2. In a similar fashion, when asset 3 comoves more with asset 2 than with asset 1, or
when |b| > |a|, liquidity will be better if asset 3 is listed on market 2.11
In fact, it is possible to show that not only does the liquidity of asset 3 changes depending
on where it lists, but also the liquidity of the existing asset in the market on which asset 3
lists improves. For example, if asset 3 lists on market 1, the ability of market makers who
trade asset 1 to learn about the private signal s1 increases because they can observe the order
ßow in asset 3. Therefore, the new listing provides a positive externality to the market. We
can further show that when |a| > |b|, the improvement to the liquidity of asset 1 when
asset 3 lists on market 1 is greater than the improvement to the liquidity of asset 2 when
10See also Strobl (2001) who investigates the allocation of multiple stocks to specialists on the NYSE in a
noisy rational expectations framework. Bhattacharya, Reny, and Spiegel (1995) look at market breakdowns
driven by adverse selection when multiple securities are traded on a single market. They demonstrate the
effect of destructive interference that might occur when the payoffs of the traded securities are too highly
correlated.
11One could claim that this logic should also apply to allocation of stocks to specialists on the ßoor of the
NYSE. In other words, that liquidity would be enhanced if stocks with correlated payoffs are traded by the
same specialist. Unfortunately, the limitations of any single person with respect to information processing or
interactions with brokers and computer screens prevent specialists from trading stocks that are very similar
(like two large technology stocks). The reason is that when there is news about a Þrm or an industry, the
number of orders that arrives for one active stock makes the specialist (and the specialists clerk) unable to
handle trading in any other security. This is because most trades on the NYSE require the specialist (or the
clerk) to manually approve the execution. Having another actively traded security that is inßuenced by the
same news event at the same time would prevent the specialist from maintaining an orderly market in either
security.
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asset 3 lists on market 2 (and vise versa if |b| > |a|).12 This result is rather intuitive because
the efficiency with which market makers learn about private information depends on the
strength of the commonality in the payoffs of the existing and new assets.
II Empirical Evidence
If managers care about liquidity, Proposition 1 implies that Þrms would list on markets
where similar securities are listed. While the intuition from our model is very general, we
carry out empirical tests on the two main U.S. markets: NYSE and Nasdaq.
The sample and data sources are discussed in Section II.1. The tests in Section II.2
have two goals. First, we examine whether the basic assumption of the modelthat the
two markets differ in terms of the return patterns of the securities listed on themholds.
Second, we study the passive decisions of Þrms that are eligible to move (to the other
market) but do not. Our model implies that eligible stocks should not move if their returns
are more correlated with securities listed on their own market than with the securities on
the other market.
In Section II.3 we present tests of the active decisions of managers using a sample of
Þrms that switch markets. Our model predicts that a Þrm would switch if its return pattern
has changed and it resembles more the return patterns of stocks on the other market. We
also discuss in this section the robustness of our conclusions to return behavior induced by
correlated liquidity trading among stocks that are listed on the same market.
II.1 Sample and Data
We use the CRSP database to generate a universe of all securities that were traded con-
tinuously in 2001, our sample period, on either the NYSE or the Nasdaq National Market
12To prove this claim we veriÞed that whenever |a| > |b|,
(1 + |b|)
2
$
a2 + (1 + |b|)2 −
(1 + |a|)
2
$
b2 + (1 + |a|)2 < 0
where the Þrst term is the price impact of asset 1 when asset 3 lists on market 1 and the second term is the
price impact of asset 2 when asset 3 lists on market 2.
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(henceforth Nasdaq or NNM). These criteria result in 5,565 securities, 2,388 from the NYSE
and 3,177 from Nasdaq. We then identify on the NYSE common stocks that were eligible to
list on Nasdaq on the Þrst day of the year, and similarly Nasdaq stocks that were eligible to
list on the NYSE on that date.
Both markets allow for multiple standards of eligibility. For example, one NYSE standard
requires a minimum level of earnings in the previous three years while another standard does
not set an earnings criterion as long as Þrms have at least $1 billion in market capitalization
and $100 million in revenue. Nasdaq Standard 1 speciÞes minimum stockholders equity of
$15 million and minimum income of $1 million while Standard 3 does not put forward any
demands on either stockholders equity or income. Instead, Þrms must meet requirements
on market capitalization, assets, or revenue.
While the different standards of the two markets offer ßexibility to Þrms, they do prevent
the listing of some securities. Each market has its own philosophy on the Þrms it wants
to attract. While both markets compete Þercely for the large, heavily-traded Þrms, the
more stringent requirements of the NYSE make Nasdaq the only choice for many smaller or
younger Þrms.
In order to investigate the listing choices of managers, we need to identify the Þrms that
actually have a choice: those that are listed on one market and satisfy the listing require-
ments of the other market. We therefore use information in the CRSP and COMPUSTAT
databases to evaluate each stock and see if it satisÞes the listing requirement of the other
market. Most criteria speciÞed by the NYSE and Nasdaq can be mapped rather well to
the information in these two databases. Appendix B contains the variables we use from
CRSP and COMPUSTAT for each of the listing requirements. Some slippage, however, is
inevitable as the NYSE and Nasdaq evaluate information provided by the Þrms themselves
that is not necessarily identical to what we observe in the databases.13 Therefore, despite
13Probably the most notable difficulty is with public ßoat information, deÞned as total shares outstanding
less any shares held by officers, directors, or beneÞcial owners of 10 percent or more. No academic database
(to our knowledge) contains historical public ßoat data. Our attempts to construct such a variable from
information in CRSP and insider Þlings from Thomson Financial Securities Data proved unsuccessful.
13
our best efforts, the procedure we use to determine eligibility may introduce some noise into
the analysis.
Our procedures identiÞes 1,055 NYSE common stocks that were eligible to list on Nasdaq
on January 1, 2001. We will refer to them throughout the analysis as the NYSE eligible
group (or NYSEe). The remaining NYSE securities in our universe (1,333) will be referred
to as the non-eligible NYSE group (or NYSEne).14 Similarly, our procedure yields a list of
415 Nasdaq National Market (NNM) common stocks that were eligible to list on the NYSE
at the beginning of our sample period, henceforth NNMe. The other Nasdaq securities in
our universe (2,762) will be referred to as the Nasdaq non-eligible group (or NNMne).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the securities using information from the CRSP
database. The median market capitalization of non-eligible securities is lower than that of
eligible ones. Non-eligible securities in both markets also trade less and have lower prices.
This pattern, however, does not extend to returns. The median observation of the average
daily returns of non-eligible NYSE securities is almost identical to that of eligible NYSE
stocks. In addition, while non-eligible Nasdaq securities have greater daily return standard
deviations than eligible Nasdaq stocks, the situation is reversed for NYSE securities where
the return standard deviation of NYSEne is smaller than that of NYSEe. Firms that are
eligible to list on both markets are clearly larger and have a more active investor base, but
this does not seem to have any obvious implications for the means and standard deviations of
their returns during the sample period. The tests in Section II.2 use CRSP daily returns in
2001 to examine the similarity in return patterns between eligible and non-eligible securities
on both markets.
Our tests in Section II.3 use a sample of all common stocks that voluntarily switched
between the Nasdaq National Market and the NYSE in 2001.15 There were 28 Þrms with
14The group of non-eligible securities include non-common stocks (ADRs, REITs, etc.). We include them
because market makers in our model can potentially learn useful information from all other securities that
are listed on the same market. We see no reason to restrict the market makers information set in the
empirical work. We focus on common stocks for the eligible groups in order to make the determination of
eligibility less complex (and therefore to reduce potential misclassiÞcations).
15The NYSE revised Rule 500 in 1999 to make it easier for Þrms to delist. The amended rule no longer
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common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11) that switched markets: 27 moving from
Nasdaq to the NYSE and one moving in the opposite direction. The only switch from the
NYSE to Nasdaq was involuntary: the NYSE notiÞed TD Woods Corp. that it did not meet
the NYSEs continuing listing criteria. Therefore, we are left with 27 voluntary switches.
Panel A of Table 2 lists the 27 Þrms in the sample and the dates of their moves, while Panel
B provides summary statistics on the switching sample.
II.2 Similarity in Return Patterns: NYSE and Nasdaq Stocks
In this section we look at the return patterns of NYSE and Nasdaq Þrms. First, we would
like to see if the assumption of our model that the two markets differ in terms of the return
patterns of the Þrms that are listed on them indeed holds. We also would like to investigate
here the passive decisions of Þrms to stay on a given market. If indeed these are optimal
in the sense of our model (i.e., they maximize liquidity), it must be that stocks that are
eligible to move to the other market but stay are more similar to securities listed on their
market than to securities listed on the other market.
When we move from the theoretical model to the empirical tests, we need to deÞne what
we mean by similar Þrms. In the model, similarity was formalized by a common source of
variation in the payoffs. In the empirical work, we would like to capture this similarity by
looking at the daily return patterns of Þrms. Still, there is more than one way in which the
model can be used to motivate empirical deÞnitions of such similarity, and we are using two
separate deÞnitions in our tests.
For the Þrst deÞnition of return similarity we interpret the private information in the
model as information about common factors in returns. Pure Nasdaq stocks may be
more sensitive to a certain common factor, say s1, while pure NYSE stocks may be more
sensitive to another common factor, s2. According to this interpretation, θ1, θ2, and θ3
represent unsystematic risk and are therefore uncorrelated with each other. Our model
required shareholders approval (just that of the board of directors). One Þrm voluntarily switched from the
NYSE to Nasdaq in 2000 (see Kalay and Portniaguina (2001)), but none did so in 2001.
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predicts that Nasdaq stocks that are eligible to list on the NYSE would stay on Nasdaq if
they are more sensitive to s1 than to s2, or that |a| > |b| (see Proposition 1). Similarly,
NYSE stocks that are eligible to list on Nasdaq remain on the NYSE because their returns
are more sensitive to s2, like the other NYSE securities, than to s1.
Our second deÞnition of return similarity interprets a private signal in the model as
information that can be relevant to certain Þrms but not necessarily to the entire market.
Since θi in our model could be correlated across securities, it can be thought of as a stock
speciÞc sensitivity to the market portfolio multiplied by the excess return on the market.
Therefore, θi assumes the role of the common element in returns, while the independent
signals, s1 and s2, induce some comovement in the returns of certain stocks even if they are
not common to the entire economy.16 Under this interpretation, we would obtain a cleaner
picture of return variation due to the private signals by removing the inßuence of the market
portfolio and looking at return residuals.
The methodology we use to examine the Þrst deÞnition of return similarity is principal
component analysis, where we look at the sensitivities of NYSE and Nasdaq stocks returns
to common sources of return variation. Because there are 248 days in the sample period
and 5,565 securities, we form 15 portfolios from the securities in each group (for a total of
60 portfolios).17 Since each group contains a different number of securities, N , we randomly
assign approximately N/15 securities to each portfolio. For example, the 1,055 stocks in the
NYSEe group are divided such that 14 portfolios contain 70 stocks each, and one portfolio
contains the remaining 75 stocks. Portfolio returns are computed as averages of the daily
returns on the stocks in the portfolio. We then perform a principal component analysis of
daily portfolio returns in 2001.18 To be consistent with the model, we retain the Þrst two
16This does not change if one adds uncorrelated sources of noise, !1 and !2, to the payoffs of securities 1
and 2, respectively.
17We aggregate securities into portfolios because the principal component analysis cannot identify loadings
when the number of observations (days) is smaller than the number of variables (securities).
18We repeated the analysis with equal number of securities in each of the 60 portfolios by randomly drawing
without replacement 25 securities from each group to form each portfolio. The number of stocks was chosen
such that even the smallest group (NNMe) would enable us to form 15 different portfolios with 25 stocks
each. The results of this analysis were similar to the results presented below and are therefore not reported.
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principal components and use an orthogonal rotation.19 The procedure provides estimates
of the loadings on the two principal components. These loadings can be interpreted as the
bivariate correlations between the portfolios returns and the principal components.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the mean and standard deviation of the rotated factor loadings
of the four groups of securities. The mean loading on the Þrst component of eligible Nasdaq
stocks is 0.813, much closer to the mean of non-eligible Nasdaq securities, 0.795, than to
that of either NYSE groups, 0.437 (NYSEne) or 0.488 (NYSEe). Nasdaq securities seem to
load more heavily on the Þrst component than do NYSE securities. In Panel B of Table 3
we use an ANOVA to further examine the difference between the loadings of the different
groups. The results indicate that the main effect of being listed on a particular market is
highly statistically signiÞcant (p-value< 0.0001). The difference in the means of the loadings
on the Þrst principal component between Nasdaq and NYSE securities is 0.34 while the
difference between the loadings of securities that are eligible to list on the other market and
those that are not is only one tenth that magnitude (0.035). Nonetheless, the variability of
the estimated loadings is small enough so that the main effect of eligibility is statistically
signiÞcant as well (p-value= 0.0037).
While Nasdaq securities load more heavily on the Þrst principal component, NYSE se-
curities load more heavily on the second component. The mean loading of NYSE eligible
portfolios is 0.799, much closer to the magnitude of the other NYSE securities (0.798) than to
the mean loading of either Nasdaq groups: 0.493 (NNMne) or 0.429 (NNMe). The ANOVA
also recognizes signiÞcant market and eligibility effects for the second principal component
(and a signiÞcant interaction as well).20 As before, the market effect is more signiÞcant and
the difference in the means between Nasdaq and NYSE securities is more than ten times
greater than the difference in the means between the loadings of eligible and non-eligible
securities.
19We apply the commonly used VARIMAX rotation. See, for example, Kaiser (1958) and Hatcher (1994).
20An ANOVA simple effects analysis shows that there is no signiÞcant difference between the NYSEe and
NYSEne estimates (0.799 and 0.798). The signiÞcant interaction is driven by differences between the Nasdaq
groups (0.493 and 0.429).
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The results of the principal component analysis are important in two respects. First, if
we take the principal components to represent estimates of common factors, Nasdaq stocks
are more sensitive to one factor (s1) and NYSE stocks are more sensitive to another factor
(s2). This Þnding is consistent with the assumption that we use as the primitive of our
approach: that there are two groups of Þrms with different return patterns and each group is
listed on a different market. Evidence consistent with the basic setup of the model increases
our conÞdence in the implications of the model. Second, since our test separates eligible and
non-eligible stocks in each market, we are able to look at the passive optimality of Þrms
decision to stay on a market (as opposed to the active optimality of switching Þrms that
we investigate in the next section). We Þnd that eligible stocks in each market have loadings
that are more similar to those of non-eligible securities in the same market than to loadings
of securities listed on the other market. This evidence is consistent with the eligible Þrms
managers making optimal (passive) listing decisions by not moving to the other market.
We also conduct a test of the passive optimality of Þrms decisions using the second
deÞnition of similarity in return patterns that we discussed at the beginning of this section.
To remove the effect of common variability in returns and focus on the private signals, we run
a market model for each security using daily returns in 2001 and the Standard and Poors
500 Index as a proxy for the market portfolio. We then take the residuals from the market
model and normalize them to have unit variance.
Note that in the model, the comovement of the payoffs of asset 1 and asset 3 in market 1
after eliminating θ1 and θ3 is simply a. Similarly, the comovement of asset 2 and asset 3 in
market 2 after eliminating θ2 and θ3 is equal to b. Proposition 1 states that the difference
between the absolute values of a and b determines the optimal choice of a manager between
the two markets. Our market model procedure is meant to eliminate θi from the returns of
all securities. Therefore, to estimate |a|, we compute for each eligible stock the correlation
between its normalized residual and the normalized residuals of all non-eligible securities
on Nasdaq. We denote the average of the absolute values of these correlations as |a¯i|. To
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estimate b, we compute for each eligible stock the correlation between its normalized residual
and the normalized residuals of all non-eligible securities on the NYSE.We denote the average
of the absolute values of these correlations as |b¯i|.
If eligible Nasdaq securities optimally stay on Nasdaq, it should be that the average
absolute value of their correlations with non-eligible Nasdaq securities is greater than the
average absolute value of their correlations with non-eligible NYSE securities. Similarly,
for eligible NYSE stocks we would predict that their estimates of |b¯i| (the magnitude of
comovement with non-eligible NYSE securities) will be greater than their estimates of |a¯i|
(the magnitude of comovement with non-eligible Nasdaq stocks). Therefore, we test whether
|a¯i|− |b¯i| > 0 for NNMe and |b¯i|− |a¯i| > 0 for NYSEe.
Panel A of Table 4 provides the means and medians of |a¯i|, |b¯i|, and |a¯i|− |b¯i| for the 415
eligible Nasdaq stocks. The t-test indicates that the mean of |a¯i|− |b¯i| is positive and highly
statistically signiÞcant (p-value= 0.0079). Similarly, a Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that
the median is positive and statistically signiÞcant. Panel B of Table 4 provides the results
for the 1,055 eligible NYSE stocks. The mean and median of the differences |b¯i| − |a¯i| are
positive and even greater in magnitude than those of the Nasdaq stocks. Both tests are
highly statistically signiÞcant (p-value< 0.0001). These Þndings provide additional support
to the hypothesis that managers of Þrms choose to list their companies on the market where
similar Þrms are listed. We qualify this conclusion at this point because so far we only
tested the passive choices of managerswhere we infer the choice from no action taken to
move the stock to a different market. In the next section we examine the active choices of
managers to switch markets.
II.3 Tests using Switching Firms
In this section we test of the implications of our model using Þrms that switched from Nasdaq
to the NYSE in 2001. Our model posits that a stocks return pattern affects its liquidity via
the interaction with other securities that are listed on the same market. If the decision to
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switch markets is motivated by the desire to improve liquidity, it must be that the return
patterns of the stocks that switch had changed to make their old market no longer optimal.
We therefore would like to examine changes in the return patterns of stocks that switch
prior to their actual move to see if indeed they become more similar to the return patterns
of stocks on the new market.
The use of switching Þrms to test the implications of our model has another advantage
in that it helps in distinguishing our mechanism from the alternative hypothesis that the
return patterns we documented in Section II.2 are due to correlated liquidity trading. More
speciÞcally, say each market has its own class of liquidity (or noise) traders who trade the
assets listed on their market but not assets listed on the other market. For example, a class of
such informationless traders could be those buying and selling index funds. As some indexes
are market speciÞc (e.g., the Nasdaq 100 Index), it is conceivable that cash ßows into and
out of such index funds or creation and redemption of Exchange Traded Funds that follow
market-speciÞc indexes (e.g., the QQQ) may cause the prices of assets listed on the same
market to move together.
What happens if we introduce into the model of Section 1 correlated liquidity trading
for assets that are listed on the same market? Let ρ denote the correlation among liquidity
traders. Figure 1 shows how the value of the difference in equation (3) changes with ρ.21 To
maintain a two dimensional Þgure, we Þx a = 1 and draw 5 lines: two for |a| > |b|, two for
|a| < |b|, and one for |a| = |b|. We see that the two curves for which |a| > |b| are in the
negative domain implying better liquidity on market 1, and the difference λ3(1)
2 − λ3(2)2
becomes more negative as ρ increases. The opposite happens when |a| < |b|: the two
curves are in the positive domain implying that liquidity is better on market 2, and the
difference is monotonically increasing with ρ. Therefore, the main implication of our model
(Proposition 1) still holds when correlated liquidity trading is considered.
There are clear distinctions between our model and this alternative hypothesis. The
21The solution to the model with correlated liquidity trading is available from the authors upon request.
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model uses return patterns as a primitive and suggests that these determine optimal listing
choices that reinforce the situation where Þrms listed on the same market have more similar
return patterns. On the other hand, the alternative hypothesis takes the act of listing as a
primitive and claims that listing on a market brings about correlated liquidity trading and
thus induces similarity in the return patterns of the listing Þrm and other Þrms traded on the
same market.22 To examine the robustness of our conclusions to the alternative hypothesis,
we would like to see whether changes in return patterns occur before a Þrm is listed on a
market, and whether the listing decision is consistent with moving to a market populated
by Þrms with similar return patterns.
There are a couple of issues that should be mentioned upfront with respect to this exercise.
First, there may be other reasons for Þrms to switch markets (e.g., a preferred regulator).
Switches that are motivated by other considerations would introduce noise into the tests and
make it more difficult for us to Þnd an effect. Second, there are really no guidelines for how
long prior to a switch we should analyze the data to detect the changes in return patterns.
It is reasonable to look at the year prior to the move as the decision to move was probably
made at that point. But this decision could have been made following a long period in which
the return pattern changed to be more like that of Þrms listed on the other market before
managers decided to switch.23 Therefore, the choice of a period to analyze prior to a switch
is arbitrary in nature. With these reservations in mind, we proceed to use the methodologies
from Section II.2 to examine the return patterns of the stocks in the switching sample.
Our Þrst test is based on the principal components methodology. As Table 2 shows,
the 27 switches occur at different times during the year. Because the principal component
analysis requires having the same time interval for all stocks, we use calender time to deÞne
the periods we investigate. In other words, we look at the similarity of return patterns in
22See also Chan, Hameed, and Lau (2003).
23One could also argue that managers may be able to foresee that their Þrms would become more similar to
NYSE Þrms before the return patterns change, and so the move would come in anticipation of this process.
Of course, the implication of this interpretation is similar to that of the alternative hypothesis and so our
tests would not be able to separate the two.
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calender years 1999 and 2000. Later in this section we implement the methodology using
correlations of normalized market model residuals where we are able to study what happens
one, two, and three years prior to the switch date deÞned individually for each stock in the
sample.
The Þrst step in the principal component methodology is to generate from the CRSP
database a universe of all securities that were traded continuously in 1999 on either the
NYSE or the Nasdaq National Market (excluding the 27 stocks in our switching sample).
As in Section II.2, we form 30 portfolios from the stocks in each market (for a total of 60
portfolios). Say a market contains N securities; we randomly assign approximately N/30
securities to each portfolio. We also form a switching portfolio by computing the equal-
weighted returns in 1999 of the stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE in 2001 (our
sample Þrms). Using these 61 portfolios, we then perform a principal component analysis of
daily portfolio returns in 1999 and retain the loadings on the Þrst two principal components.
We want to look at the distance of the switching portfolios loading from the loadings
of the NYSE and NNM portfolios, and how this distance changes over time. We therefore
compute 30 distances of the switching portfolio loading from NYSE stocks by taking the
absolute value of the difference between the loading (say on the Þrst principal component)
of the switching portfolio and the loadings on the same principal component of the 30 NYSE
portfolios. Similarly, we compute 30 distances of the switching portfolios loading from the
loadings of the NNM portfolios. We repeat this procedure of randomly assigning securities
into portfolios and performing a principal component analysis 100 times.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the mean, median, and standard deviation of the distances from
the NYSE and NNM stocks across the 3, 000 observations (30 distances from each market
times 100 random assignments) for the Þrst principal component. The mean distance of
the switching portfolios loading from the loadings of the NYSE portfolios is 0.3372, and
is larger than the mean distance of the switching sample from the NNM portfolios, 0.1157.
The statistical tests we perform are all highly signiÞcant, indicating that the distance of the
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switching sample from NYSE stocks is indeed much larger than the distance of the switching
sample from NNM stocks.24 Panel B of Table 5 shows the results for the second principal
component. The mean distance of the switching portfolios loading from the loadings of the
NYSE portfolios is 0.2480, and all tests show that it is signiÞcantly larger than the mean
distance of the switching portfolio from the NNM portfolios, 0.1016. Our sample stocks in
1999 indeed look more like other Nasdaq stocks than like NYSE stocks.
We repeat the same procedure for the year 2000, and the results in Table 5 indicate a
pronounced shift. The average distance of the switching sample from NYSE stocks is smaller
than its average distance from NNM stocks, and all statistical tests indicate that indeed the
NYSE distance is signiÞcantly smaller. This is true for both the Þrst and second principal
components. It appears that indeed the return patterns of the stocks in the switching sample
become more similar to those of NYSE stocks over that time period.25
Our next test is based on the second methodology of Section II.2 (the market model
residuals). We run for each security a daily market model in each calender year (1998-2001),
and save the normalized residuals. We do the same for our sample of switching stocks. Now
we deÞne three non-overlapping one-year periods for each stock in the sample relative to the
date it moved to the NYSE: from the switch date to one year prior to that date (henceforth
period t− 1), from one year prior to the date to two years prior to the date (period t− 2),
and from two years prior to the date to three years prior to the date (period t − 3). For
each of the one-year periods prior to the switch and for each stock in the switching sample
we compute |a¯i| and |b¯i| as in Section II.2.26
24We report several statistical tests of the hypothesis that the distance of the switching sample from NYSE
stocks is different from the distance of the switching sample from NNM stocks. First, we perform a t-test and
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test using all 3000 observations. Second, we perform a separate test on each random
draw (30 observations), average the magnitude of the t-statistic or the Z-statistic over the 100 random draws,
and report the p-value associated with this average magnitude. We also report how many of the 100 tests
are signiÞcant at the 5% level.
25Note that we do not need to utilize a separate control sample in order to establish this result because
our methodology uses all securities listed on each market as a control, and our tests compare differences
between our sample and these controls.
26If there are fewer than three months of daily returns common to a sample switching stock and a Nasdaq
or NYSE security on any given one-year period, we do not include the correlation between them in the
computation of |a¯i| or |b¯i|.
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Table 6 provides the cross-sectional means and medians of |b¯i|− |a¯i| for the 27 stocks in
our switching sample in each of the one-year periods, as well as p-values from a t-test and
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test against the hypothesis of a zero difference. In period t− 3, the
mean magnitude of the difference is 0.0016, but none of the tests is statistically signiÞcant
indicating that the correlation measures of the switching stocks with stocks listed on both
markets are similar in magnitude. The mean difference increases to 0.0035 in period t−2 and
then again to 0.0048 in period t− 1 (the year prior to the switch). The statistical tests are
highly signiÞcant in both those periods, indicating that the return patterns of the switching
stocks are moving in the direction of being more similar to those of NYSE stocks.
To summarize, both methodologies provide evidence that the return patterns of stocks
that switch from Nasdaq to the NYSE become more similar to the return patterns of stocks
listed on the NYSE and less similar to the return patterns of Nasdaq stocks prior to switch-
ing. In fact, this change is documented up to two years before moving to the NYSE and
hence is likely to have been underway when the decision to switch was made. These Þndings
have two implications for our discussion. First, they document a change in return patterns
prior to a decision to switch listings, which is consistent with our model where return pat-
terns affect the listing decision. Second, they show a shift to having return patterns more
similar to NYSE stocks prior to the sample stocks actually moving to list on the NYSE.
This supports the conclusion that managers behave in accordance with our model, or that
they switch markets to maximize the liquidity of their stocks. The results of this section
are therefore consistent with our Þndings in Section II.2 that managers of Þrms optimally
choose to list their companies on the market where similar Þrms are listed.
III Conclusion
In this paper we provide an explanation for the listing choice of Þrms based on asset returns.
To make this point very clear, our model features two markets with the same structure and
price setting rules. As a primitive of the problem we assume that securities listed on the
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two markets differ with respect to their return patterns. There are many ways in which such
a situation can arise. For example, it may be caused by listing requirements: one market
sets listing requirements that are met only by very large Þrms, while another market tries to
attract small start-ups. Examples of markets that cater to different Þrms exist around the
world and reßect a multitude of business models and marketing decisions. The end result is
that more related Þrms tend to be traded on the same market.
Our approach does not state that listing requirements and other market-speciÞc elements
have no role in determining the listing choice. What it does, however, is to identify a speciÞc
mechanism that creates an optimal listing choice when stocks with different return patterns
are listed on different markets. The mechanism we propose is that information asymmetry
among investors creates differences in liquidity depending on the market on which a Þrm
chooses to list. In fact, that mechanism will tend to perpetuate itself (Þrms will continue to
list on the market where similar Þrms are listed) and therefore can create path-dependence
even if the reason for the initial clustering of similar Þrms on a market no longer exists.
Our model suggests that by making optimal listing decisions, managers can help reduce
the adverse selection costs incurred by investors who trade their Þrms stocks. Indeed,
managers often cite liquidity as a factor in choosing a market.27 Firms listed on the Deutsche
Bo¨rse even pay Designated Sponsors to act as market makers for the Þrms stocks in order
to enhance their liquidity. A primary reason for managers to care about liquidity is if they
maximize shareholder wealth and liquidity is priced, with the latter currently being the
subject of intense research in asset pricing and market microstructure. However, even if
liquidity is not priced directly (i.e., it does not affect the Þrms cost of capital), there may be
other reasons for a manager to care about liquidity. For example, liquid stocks may attract
a larger investor base, which would make it easier for the Þrm to issue more equity and
negotiate with underwriters for a lower fee. Irrespective of the speciÞc rationale that makes
managers care about liquidity, our empirical results suggest they do.
27See, for example, the surveys by Baker and Pettit (1982), Freedman and Rosenbaum (1987), and Baker
and Johnson (1990).
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We test our model on the two dominant markets in the U.S.: NYSE and Nasdaq. We
Þrst consider if indeed the basic assumption of our modelthat there are two groups of Þrms
with different return patterns each listed on a different marketholds for the NYSE and
Nasdaq. We show that Nasdaq securities load more heavily on one principal component of
returns while NYSE securities load more heavily on another principal component, consistent
with the assumption of the model. We also show that the loadings of Nasdaq stocks that
are eligible to list on the NYSE look more similar to those of non-eligible Nasdaq securities
than to those of NYSE securities; NYSE stocks that are eligible to list on Nasdaq look more
like non-eligible NYSE securities than Nasdaq securities. We then use correlations of market
model residuals to deÞne similarity of return patterns and Þnd that the return residuals of
eligible stocks comove more with the return residuals of non-eligible securities from their
own market than with the return residuals of securities from the other market.28 The results
of these tests suggest that the passive choice made by managers of the eligible Þrms not to
switch markets is optimal. By that we mean that the return patterns of eligible stocks that
remain listed on their market despite the ability to switch are such that staying is indeed
the liquidity maximizing thing to do.
We then turn to tests of managers active choices by looking at Þrms that switch
markets. These tests have the advantage that they separate our approach from an alternative
hypothesis according to which correlated liquidity trading may induce comovement in the
returns of Þrms that are listed on the same market. We Þnd that the return patterns of stocks
in the sample change before the actual change in listings (and possibly before the decision
on the change in listings was made), and that the change makes them more similar to stocks
listed on the new market. These results are consistent both with our model, where return
patterns affect listing decisions, and with our conclusions that managers act to maximize
liquidity by their choice of where to list their stocks.
28It is, of course, possible that the true return generating process has a multi-factor structure and the
residuals from the market model contain some systematic elements. This does not change our conclusions
because our theoretical model would imply a similar test in this case, and therefore the results we Þnd would
suggest optimal listing decisions under this alternative interpretation as well.
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Our model also implies that a new listing generates a positive externality for the Þrms
already listed on a market: the liquidity of the existing asset improves when the new asset
lists because market makers can learn private information on the signal that is common to
both assets. Managers who decide on the listing venue for their Þrms may not take that effect
into account when making their choices. Hence, deciding on a listing venue using a different
criterion (not liquidity maximization) could be socially suboptimal in that it may prevent
the improvement in liquidity that the other stocks would experience if the decision was made
on the basis of return patterns. Already listed Þrms may therefore have an incentive to lure
new Þrms that they consider similar to enjoy the positive externality.
Our work demonstrates how corporate decision making can be shaped by patterns of
asset returns beyond, for example, the exercise of Þguring out the hurdle rates for projects.
The connection we form between asset pricing and corporate Þnance goes through market
microstructure and shows how the investigation of imperfections in the trading environment
of assets may hold some clues to the relation between asset returns and decision making
within the Þrm.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1: Without loss of generality, assume that the value of the assets
prior to the innovation is zero (µ = 0). Conjecture that the price rule is linear. Then, the
i-th informed trader problem is
max
Xi∈R2
E[(V − ΛY )Xi|si].
Because (i) cov(s1, s2) = 0, (ii) s has zero mean, and (iii) the other informed trader follows
a linear strategy, we have
E[(V − ΛY )Xi|si] = E[(E[V |si]− ΛXi)Xi|si].
The Þrst order condition implies
Xi = (Λ+ Λ
T )−1E[ V |si].
Thus, the strategy of the i-th trader is also linear. Also
X = X1 +X2 = (Λ+ Λ
T )−1E[ V |s1] + (Λ+ ΛT )−1E[ V |s2] = (Λ+ ΛT )−1FS.
We therefore have β = (Λ + ΛT )−1F in the Þrst equation of (2). From the theory of linear
Þltering (see, for example, Bensoussan, 1992, Theorem 1.1.1) it follows that the matrix Λ is
given by the second equation in (2).
To solve the system, we guess (and verify later) that Λ is symmetric. From the Þrst equation
in (2), we have
β = 0.5Λ−1F. (4)
Multiply the second equation from the left by Λ−1, and insert β to get
I = 2ββT (I + ββT )−1
Multiply both sides from the right by (I + ββT ) to get
I + ββT = 2ββT
Subtract ββT from both sides
I = ββT .
Insert the above in (4) to get
1
4
FF T = ΛΛ. (5)
The matrix equation in (5) has more than one solution. The linear equilibrium is the one in
which −Λ is negative semi-deÞnite. This solution is given below.29
Λ =
 (1+|b|)2√a2+(1+|b|)2 a2√a2+(1+|b|)2
a
2
√
a2+(1+|b|)2
a2+|b|(1+|b|)
2
√
a2+(1+|b|)2
 (6)
29In particular, we verify that Λ is indeed symmetric, and that Λ is positive semi-deÞnite: Λ11 > 0,Λ22 > 0
and Λ11Λ22 − Λ12Λ21 = 14 |b| > 0.
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Appendix B
The listing requirements of both the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq National
Market can be found on their respective web sites.30 We use data in CRSP and COMPU-
STAT to identify Nasdaq National Market common stocks that were eligible to list on the
NYSE and NYSE common stocks that were eligible to list on Nasdaq on January 1, 2001.
Below we provide the speciÞc data items from CRSP and COMPUSTAT that we have used
for the listing criteria of each market.
Database Definitions for Nasdaq National Market Listing Requirements
 Net Tangible Assets:31 COMPUSTAT (Data 6 − Data 181 − Data 204)
 Market Capitalization: CRSP (|prc|*curshr, for 90 consecutive days ending December
31, 2000)
 Total Revenue: COMPUSTAT (Data 12)
 Total Assets: COMPUSTAT (Data 6)
 Income from Continuing Operations before Income Taxes: COMPUSTAT (Data 170)
 Public Float (shares): CRSP (curshr, on December 31, 2000)
 Market Value of Public Float: CRSP (|prc|∗curshr, on December 31, 2000)
 Shareholders: COMPUSTAT (Data 100)
 Minimum Bid Price: CRSP (|prc|, for 90 consecutive days ending December 31, 2000)
Database Definitions for New York Stock Exchange Listing Requirements
 Shareholders: COMPUSTAT (Data 100)
 Average Monthly Trading Volume: CRSP (vol, average for the 12 months in 2000)
 Public Shares: CRSP (curshr, on December 31, 2000)
 Market Value of Public Shares: CRSP (|prc|∗curshr, on December 31, 2000)
 Pretax Earnings: COMPUSTAT (Data 170 − Data 49 + Data 55)
 Market Capitalization: CRSP (|prc|∗curshr, for the 12 months in 2000)
 Total Revenue: COMPUSTAT (Data 12)
 Operating Cash Flow: COMPUSTAT (Data 308 − Data 307 − Data 304 − Data 303
− Data 302)
30For Nasdaq see http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq listing req fees.pdf, and for NYSE see
http://www.nyse.com/listed/p1020656067970.html?displayPage=%2Flisted%2F1022221392369.html.
31On June 29, 2001, Nasdaq replaced the Net Tangible Assets requirement with a Stockholders Equity
requirement.
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Eligible and Non-Eligible Securities 
 
This table presents the sample of securities that we use for the analysis in Tables 3 and 4. The universe includes all 
NYSE and Nasdaq National Market securities that were traded continuously in 2001 with information in the CRSP 
database (5,565 securities). We divide the universe into four groups: (i) NNMe are Nasdaq National Market 
common stocks that were eligible to list on the NYSE on the first day of the year (415 securities), (ii) NNMne are all 
other Nasdaq National Market securities in our universe (2,762 securities), (iii) NYSEe are NYSE common stocks 
that were eligible to list on Nasdaq on January 1, 2001 (1,055 securities), and (iv) NYSEne are all other NYSE 
securities in our universe (1,333 securities). The following variables are calculated for each security in the 248-day 
sample period (January-December, 2001) using data in CRSP: AvgCap is the average daily market capitalization 
(the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the daily closing price), AvgPrc is the average daily closing price, 
AvgTurn in the average daily turnover (the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), 
AvgVol is the average daily dollar volume, AvgRet is the average daily returns computed from closing prices, and 
StdRet is the standard deviation of daily returns. The table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and 
separately for each of the four groups.  
 
 
   AvgCap 
(in million $)
AvgPrc 
(in $) 
AvgTurn 
(in %) 
AvgVol 
(in $1000)
AvgRet 
(in %) 
StdRet 
(in %) 
Entire  Mean 2489.2 30.94 0.594 15792.2 0.099 4.20
Sample  Median 234.1 13.52 0.338 746.2 0.077 3.55
  Std. Dev. 14126.0 922.40 0.938 75808.4 0.233 2.64
  Obs. 5565 5565 5565 5565 5565 5565
NNMne  Mean 306.5 11.73 0.630 4467.7 0.138 5.55
(non-eligible  Median 93.0 8.38 0.332 283.1 0.129 5.20
Nasdaq  Std. Dev. 1,163.2 16.46 1.064 25350.2 0.276 2.72
securities)  Obs. 2762 2762 2762 2762 2762 2762
NNMe  Mean 4851.5 25.54 1.275 72947.8 0.081 4.38
(eligible  Median 861.5 23.98 0.928 7667.0 0.097 3.94
Nasdaq  Std. Dev. 21844.8 14.74 1.236 219757.5 0.198 1.98
securities)  Obs. 415 415 415 415 415 415
NYSEne  Mean 1394.7 20.85 0.392 6256.8 0.062 2.53
(non-eligible  Median 253.1 13.88 0.235 522.7 0.046 2.13
NYSE  Std. Dev. 5261.9 70.38 0.746 26693.4 0.183 1.80
securities)  Obs. 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333 1333
NYSEe  Mean 8657.5 96.11 0.489 35004.9 0.048 2.69
(eligible  Median 1489.3 26.67 0.397 7200.7 0.047 2.46
NYSE  Std. Dev. 27805.1 2116.37 0.365 81718.0 0.141 1.11
securities)  Obs. 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055 1055
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Table 2 
Switching Sample 
 
This table presents the sample of switching firms that we use for the analysis in Tables 5 and 6. The sample includes 
all firms with common stocks that voluntarily switched between the Nasdaq National Market and the NYSE in 2001. 
Panel A lists the 27 stocks in the sample and the dates they moved from Nasdaq to the NYSE. Panel B provides 
summary statistics on the switching sample. The following variables are calculated for each stock using 2001 data in 
CRSP: AvgCap is the average daily market capitalization (the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the daily 
closing price), AvgPrc is the average daily closing price, AvgTurn in the average daily turnover (the number of 
shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding), AvgVol is the average daily dollar volume, AvgRet is 
the average daily returns computed from closing prices, and StdRet is the standard deviation of daily returns. 
 
Panel A:  Sample Stocks 
Name NYSE Symbol Nasdaq Symbol Switching Date 
SOVEREIGN BANCORP INC SOV SVRN 7/10/2001 
B M C SOFTWARE INC BMC BMCS 3/13/2001 
BERKLEY W R CORP BER BKLY 5/9/2001 
MICHAELS STORES INC MIK MIKE 12/12/2001 
NATIONAL COMMERCE FINANCIAL CORP NCF NCBC 7/25/2001 
UNITRIN INC UTR UNIT 5/24/2001 
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE INC CVH CVTY 5/16/2001 
OXFORD HEALTH PLANS INC OHP OXHP 4/18/2001 
SYBASE INC SY SYBS 5/22/2001 
SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES INC SPN SESI 5/15/2001 
CHICOS FAS INC CHS CHCS 4/11/2001 
MOVADO GROUP INC MOV MOVA 5/21/2001 
ALLIED CAPITAL CORP NEW ALD ALLC 6/6/2001 
RENAL CARE GROUP INC RCI RCGI 11/13/2001 
I D T CORP IDT IDTC 2/26/2001 
P F F BANCORP INC PFB PFFB 12/28/2001 
SUNRISE ASSISTED LIVING INC SRZ SNRZ 5/23/2001 
E TRADE GROUP INC ET EGRP 2/15/2001 
FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC FBC FLGS 7/13/2001 
MAXTOR CORP MXO MXTR 4/30/2001 
CROWN CASTLE INTERNATIONAL CORP CCI TWRS 4/25/2001 
TRIAD HOSPITALS INC TRI TRIH 4/30/2001 
TRITON P C S HOLDINGS INC TPC TPCS 7/31/2001 
ALAMOSA HOLDINGS INC APS APCS 12/6/2001 
KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUTS INC KKD KREM 5/17/2001 
IRWIN FINANCIAL CORP IFC IRWN 9/21/2001 
W HOLDING CO INC WHI WBPR 12/5/2001 
 
 
Panel B: Switching Sample Summary Statistics 
  AvgCap 
(in million $) 
AvgPrc 
(in $) 
AvgTurn 
(in %) 
AvgVol 
(in $1000) 
AvgRet 
(in %) 
StdRet 
(in %) 
 Mean  1664.7 23.41 0.787 13726.8 0.131 3.52
 Median 1318.4 22.73 0.610 10210.0 0.133 3.28
 Std. Dev. 1320.2 10.86 0.606 15720.4 0.170 1.10
 Obs. 27 27 27 27 27 27
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Table 3 
Principal Component Analysis 
 
This table presents the principal component analysis of daily returns in 2001. We divide the universe of 5,565 
securities into four groups: (i) NNMe are Nasdaq National Market common stocks that were eligible to list on the 
NYSE on the first day of the year (415 securities), (ii) NNMne are all other Nasdaq National Market securities in 
our universe (2,762 securities), (iii) NYSEe are NYSE common stocks that were eligible to list on Nasdaq on 
January 1, 2001 (1,055 securities), and (iv) NYSEne are all other NYSE securities in our universe (1,333 securities). 
In order to carry out the principal component analysis with 248 daily return observations, we construct 15 equally-
weighted portfolios from each group (for a total of 60 portfolios). Let N be the number of securities in a group. Each 
portfolio contains N/15 securities. We retain the first two principal components of portfolio returns and use the 
orthogonal VARIMAX rotation to compute the loadings on the principal components. Panel A presents the means 
and the standard deviations of the estimated portfolio loadings for the four groups. Panel B presents the p-values 
associated with an ANOVA analysis of the portfolio loadings. The ANOVA main effects are: (i) belonging to a 
market (NYSE versus Nasdaq), and (ii) eligibility to list on the other exchange (eligible versus non-eligible). The p-
values are against a two-sided alternative. 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Loadings on Principal Components  
 
1st Principal Component  
 
2nd Principal Component  
Dependent 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
NNMne 0.795 0.027 0.493 0.031 
NNMe 0.813 0.033 0.429 0.047 
NYSEne 0.437 0.056 0.798 0.032 
NYSEe 0.488 0.054 0.799 0.033 
 
 
 
Panel B:  ANOVA Analysis of Loadings 
 
 
 
1st Principal Component 
p-value 
 
2nd Principal Component 
p-value 
Market <0.0001 <0.0001 
Eligibility   0.0037   0.0016 
Market*Eligibility   0.1488   0.0010 
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Table 4 
Correlation Analysis of Market Model Residuals 
 
This table presents the analysis of correlation measures estimated from market model residuals. We divide the 
universe of 5,565 securities into four groups: (i) NNMe are Nasdaq National Market common stocks that were 
eligible to list on the NYSE on January 1, 2001 (415 securities), (ii) NNMne are all other Nasdaq National Market 
securities in our universe (2,762 securities), (iii) NYSEe are NYSE common stocks that were eligible to list on 
Nasdaq on January 1, 2001 (1,055 securities), and (iv) NYSEne are all other NYSE securities in our universe (1,333 
securities). We run a market model for each security using daily returns in 2001 and the Standard and Poor's 500 
Index as a proxy for the market portfolio. We then take the residuals from the market models of all securities, 
normalize them to have unit variance, and compute for each eligible stock the correlation between its normalized 
residual and the normalized residuals of all Nasdaq non-eligible securities. We denote the average of the absolute 
value of these correlations as | ia |. We also compute for each eligible stock the correlation between its normalized 
residual and the normalized residuals of all non-eligible NYSE securities. We denote the average of the absolute 
value of these correlations as | ib |. Panel A presents the means and medians of | ia |, | ib |, and | ia |-| ib | for eligible 
Nasdaq stocks (NNMe group). The last column shows the p-values (against a two-sided alternative) of a t-test and a 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for zero mean and median differences (| ia |-| ib |). Panel B presents the means and medians 
of | ia |, | ib |, and the difference between them for eligible NYSE stocks (NYSEe group). The last column shows the 
p-values (against a two-sided alternative) of a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for zero mean and median 
differences (| ib |-| ia |).  
 
 
 
Panel A:  Eligible Nasdaq Stocks (NNMe) 
 ia  ib  i ia b−  p-value 
Mean 0.0634 0.0623 0.0010 0.0079 
Median 0.0616 0.0610 0.0011 0.0009 
 
 
 
Panel B:  Eligible NYSE Stocks (NYSEe) 
 ia  ib  i ib a−  p-value 
Mean 0.0605 0.0666 0.0060 <0.0001 
Median 0.0593 0.0649 0.0046 <0.0001 
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 Table 5 
Switching Sample: Principal Component Analysis 
 
This table presents the principal component analysis of the switching sample. We use CRSP to obtain two universes: 
(i) all securities traded continuously in 1999 on the NYSE and the Nasdaq National Market (NNM), and (ii) all 
securities traded continuously in 2000 on the NYSE and NNM. The 27-stock switching sample includes all firms 
with common stocks that voluntarily switched between the NNM and the NYSE in 2001. For each of the years 
(1999 and 2000) we perform the following steps. We construct 30 random portfolios from each market. Let N be the 
number of securities in a market. Each portfolio contains N/30 securities. We carry out a principal component 
analysis of 61 portfolios (30 from each market and one for the switching sample). We retain the first two principal 
components of portfolio returns and use the orthogonal VARIMAX rotation to compute the loadings on the principal 
components. We compute 30 distances of the switching portfolio loading from NYSE (NNM) stocks by taking the 
absolute value of the difference between the loading of the switching portfolio and the loadings on the same 
principal component of the 30 NYSE (NNM) portfolios. We repeat 100 times this procedure of randomly assigning 
securities into portfolios and performing the principal component analysis. Panel A presents the mean, median, and 
standard deviation of the switching sample’s distances from the NYSE and NNM securities across the 3,000 
observations (30 distances for each market times 100 random assignments) for the first principal component. We 
report several statistical tests of the hypothesis that the distance of the switching sample from NYSE stocks is 
different from the distance of the switching sample from NNM stocks. The first set of t-test and Wilcoxon signed-
rank test uses all 3,000 observations. The second set is performed separately on each random draw (30 
observations), and we average the magnitude of the t-statistic or the Z-statistic over the 100 random draws and 
report the p-value associated with this average magnitude. The p-values are against a two-sided alternative. We also 
report how many of the 100 tests are significant at the 5% level. Panel B presents the results for the second principal 
component.  
 
 
Panel A: Analysis of Loadings on 1st Principal Component 
 Year 1999 Year 2000 
Distances |NYSE-Switching| |NNM-Switching| |NYSE-Switching| |NNM-Switching|
Mean 0.3372 0.1157 0.1932 0.3051 
Median 0.3414 0.1143 0.1917 0.3064 
Standard Deviation 0.0354 0.0478 0.0669 0.0157 
p-value of t-test (3000 Obs.) <0.0001 <0.0001 
p-value of W-test (3000 Obs.) <0.0001 0.0000 
Avg. of 100 t-stat. (30 Obs.) 20.29 -8.97 
p-value of average t-stat. <0.0001 <0.0001 
# of significant tests (5%) 100 100 
Avg. of 100 W-stat. (30 Obs.) 6.63 -5.90 
p-value of average W-stat. <0.0001 <0.0001 
# of significant tests (5%) 100 100 
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 Panel B: Analysis of Loadings on 2nd Principal Component 
 Year 1999 Year 2000 
Distances |NYSE-Switching| |NNM-Switching| |NYSE-Switching| |NNM-Switching|
Mean 0.2480 0.1016 0.1836 0.2703 
Median 0.2477 0.1045 0.1868 0.2710 
Standard Deviation 0.0445 0.0375 0.0359 0.0275 
p-value of t-test (3000 Obs.) <0.0001 <0.0001 
p-value of W-test (3000 Obs.) <0.0001 <0.0001 
Avg. of 100 t-stat. (30 Obs.) 13.72 -10.50 
p-value of average t-stat. <0.0001 <0.0001 
# of significant tests (5%) 100 100 
Avg. of 100 W-stat. (30 Obs.) 6.59 -6.36 
p-value of average W-stat. <0.0001 <0.0001 
# of significant tests (5%) 100 100 
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Table 6 
Switching Sample: Correlation Analysis of Market Model Residuals 
 
This table presents the analysis of correlation measures estimated from market model residuals for the switching 
sample. The 27-stock switching sample includes all firms with common stocks that voluntarily switched between the 
NNM and the NYSE in 2001. We use CRSP to identify all securities traded in the years 1998−2001on the NYSE 
and the Nasdaq National Market (NNM). We run for each security a daily market model in each calendar year, and 
normalize the residuals to have unit variance. We define three non-overlapping one-year periods for each stock in 
the switching sample relative to the date it moved to the NYSE: from the switch date to one year prior to that date 
(period t−1), from one year prior to the date to two years prior to the date (period t−2), and from two years prior to 
the date to three years prior to the date (period t−3). For each of the one-year periods prior to the switch and for each 
stock in the switching sample we compute the correlation between the stock’s normalized residual and the 
normalized residuals of all Nasdaq securities. We denote the average of the absolute value of these correlations as 
| ia |. We also compute for each stock in the switching sample in each one-year period the correlation between its 
normalized residual and the normalized residuals of all NYSE securities. We denote the average of the absolute 
value of these correlations as | ib |. We present the mean and median of | ib |−| ia | for the 27 stocks in our switching 
sample in each of the one-year periods, as well as p-values from a t-test and a Wilcoxon singed-rank test again the 
two-sided hypothesis of a zero difference.  
 
 
 Period t−3 Period t−2 Period t−1 
Mean 0.0016 0.0035 0.0048 
Median 0.0006 0.0019 0.0036 
p-value (t-test) 0.1200 0.0050 0.0010 
p-value (Wilcoxon test) 0.3260 0.0050 0.0020 
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Figure 1 
Differences across Markets in Price Impact of Asset 3 with Correlated Liquidity Trading 
This figure presents the difference between the squared price impact of Asset 3 when it is listed on Market 1, λ3(1)2, 
and the squared price impact of Asset 3 when it is listed on Market 2, λ3(1)2, as a function of the correlation in the 
liquidity demand of the two assets in a market, ρ. When this difference is negative (positive), liquidity is better on 
Market 1 (Market 2). We fix the value of the sensitivity of Asset 3 to s1 (a=1), and graph the difference in price 
impacts as a function of ρ for 5 values of the sensitivity of Asset 3 to s2: b=0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, and 1.5. 
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